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  INTRODUCTION	  	  Scientific	  representation	  is	  a	  booming	  field	  nowadays	  within	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  with	  many	  papers	  published	  regularly	  on	  the	  topic	  every	  year,	  and	  several	  yearly	  conferences	  and	  workshops	  on	  related	  topics.	  Historically	  the	  topic	  originates	  in	  two	  different	  strands	  in	  20th	  century	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  One	  strand	  begins	  in	  the	  1950s	  with	  philosophical	  interest	  upon	  the	  nature	  of	  scientific	  theories.	  As	  the	  received	  or	  ‘syntactic’	  view	  gave	  way	  to	  a	  “semantic”	  or	  “structural”	  conception,	  representation	  progressively	  gained	  the	  centre	  stage.	  Yet,	  there	  is	  another,	  older,	  strand	  that	  links	  representation	  to	  fin	  de	  siècle	  modelling	  debates,	  particularly	  in	  the	  emerging	  ‘bildtheorie’	  of	  Boltzmann	  and	  Hertz,	  and	  to	  the	  ensuing	  discussion	  amongst	  philosophers	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thereafter.	  Both	  strands	  feed	  into	  present	  day	  philosophical	  work	  on	  scientific	  representation.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  orthogonal	  questions	  that	  philosophers	  ask	  regarding	  representation.	  One	  may	  ask	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  representational	  relation	  between	  theories	  or	  models,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  real-­‐world	  systems	  they	  purportedly	  represent.	  Such	  questions	  lie	  at	  the	  more	  metaphysical	  and	  abstract	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  –	  and	  are	  often	  addressed	  with	  the	  abstract	  tools	  of	  the	  analytical	  metaphysician.	  They	  constitute	  what	  we	  may	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  “analytical	  inquiry”	  into	  representation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  there	  are	  questions	  regarding	  the	  use	  that	  scientists	  put	  some	  representations	  to	  in	  practice	  –	  these	  are	  questions	  that	  are	  best	  addressed	  by	  means	  of	  some	  of	  the	  philosopher	  of	  science’s	  favourite	  tools	  –	  descriptive	  analysis,	  illustration	  by	  means	  of	  case	  studies,	  induction,	  exemplification,	  inference	  from	  practice,	  etc	  –	  and	  are	  best	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “practical	  inquiry”	  into	  representation.	  The	  notion	  of	  representation	  invoked	  in	  such	  inquiries	  may	  be	  ‘deflationary’	  or	  ‘substantive’	  –	  depending	  on	  whether	  it	  construes	  representation	  as	  a	  primitive	  notion,	  or	  as	  susceptible	  to	  further	  reduction	  or	  analysis	  in	  terms	  of	  something	  else.	  	  	  	  	  	  GENERAL	  OVERVIEWS	  	  Discussion	  of	  representation	  amongst	  scientists	  –	  physicists	  in	  particular	  –	  and	  philosophers	  alike	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  19th	  century.	  Yet,	  explicit	  and	  articulate	  reflections	  upon	  representation	  within	  philosophy	  of	  science	  are	  much	  more	  recent,	  and	  arguably	  only	  emerge	  about	  15	  years	  ago.	  Already	  a	  historical	  document,	  Hughes	  1997	  started	  the	  interest	  of	  many	  of	  us	  on	  the	  topic.	  A	  number	  of	  recent	  book-­‐length	  treatments	  such	  as	  Pincock	  2012	  and	  Winsberg	  2011	  provide	  general	  overviews	  from	  different	  angles	  and	  philosophical	  persuasions	  –	  thus	  bearing	  witness	  to	  the	  extraordinary	  fertility	  of	  the	  topic	  within	  recent	  years.	  There	  are	  as	  of	  today	  very	  few	  state	  of	  the	  art	  papers	  such	  as	  Suárez	  2010;	  but	  fortunately	  many	  of	  the	  recent	  book	  length	  contributions	  start	  off	  by	  setting	  some	  of	  the	  required	  background	  –	  see	  Boniolo	  2007	  and	  Van	  Fraassen	  2008.	  The	  selection	  in	  this	  section	  attends	  mainly	  to	  accessibility	  as	  an	  introduction	  and	  /	  or	  overview.	  	  	  Boniolo,	  Giovanni.	  On	  Scientific	  Representations:	  From	  Kant	  to	  a	  New	  Philosophy	  of	  Science.	  London	  and	  New	  York:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  2007	  	   A	  historical	  introduction	  to	  the	  topic	  emphasizing	  its	  sources	  in	  semantics	  and	  epistemology	  from	  Kant	  onwards.	  It	  then	  discusses	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  theories	  and	  models,	  thought	  experiments,	  and	  fictions	  and	  possible	  world	  semantics.	  The	  historical	  ambition	  is	  awesome,	  but	  the	  book	  is	  rather	  brief	  –	  so,	  inevitably,	  much	  detail	  is	  missing.	  Yet,	  the	  tone	  is	  light,	  and	  the	  level	  is	  appropriate	  for	  the	  uninitiated.	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  Hughes,	  RIG.	  “Models	  and	  Representation.”	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  64	  (1997):	  325-­‐36.	  	   This	  paper	  inspired	  many	  subsequent	  contributions	  to	  the	  topic.	  A	  major	  towering	  achievement	  by	  a	  contemporary	  philosopher,	  it	  not	  only	  put	  scientific	  representation	  on	  the	  table,	  it	  also	  managed	  to	  provide	  (within	  scarcely	  10	  pages)	  both	  the	  backbones	  of	  one	  of	  the	  most	  fertile	  deflationary	  approaches,	  and	  the	  outlines	  of	  criticisms	  against	  substantive	  notions	  of	  representation.	  	  	  	  Pincock,	  Christopher.	  Mathematics	  and	  Scientific	  Representation,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012.	  	   A	  well	  argued	  and	  thought	  through	  and	  discussion	  of	  representation	  by	  means	  of	  mathematical	  structures.	  It	  discusses	  some	  of	  the	  major	  alternatives	  fairly	  and	  concisely,	  and	  provides	  a	  view	  of	  its	  own,	  which	  tries	  out	  the	  unfashionable	  route	  to	  build	  a	  substantive	  theory	  of	  representation	  as	  structural	  matching.	  	  	  Van	  Fraassen,	  Bas.	  Scientific	  Representation:	  Paradoxes	  of	  Perspective.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008.	  	   By	  now	  already	  a	  classic	  oeuvre	  by	  one	  of	  the	  most	  accomplished	  philosophers	  of	  science	  of	  our	  generation,	  and	  a	  pioneer	  on	  the	  topic.	  Van	  Fraassen’s	  life	  work	  traces	  a	  significant	  route	  from	  a	  concern	  chiefly	  with	  the	  structure	  of	  theories	  towards	  more	  pragmatic	  issues	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  models	  in	  scientific	  practice,	  which	  culminates	  in	  this	  major	  work.	  	  	  Suárez,	  Mauricio.	  “Scientific	  Representation.”	  Philosophy	  Compass,	  5:	  1	  (2010):	  91-­‐101.	  	  	   One	  of	  the	  few	  state	  of	  the	  art	  papers	  available	  on	  the	  topic.	  It	  introduces	  some	  of	  the	  distinctions	  employed	  in	  this	  bibliography	  –	  such	  as	  analytical	  vs.	  practical	  inquiries,	  and	  substantive	  vs.	  deflationary	  conceptions	  –,	  and	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  helpful	  complement	  to	  the	  present	  document.	  	  	  Winsberg,	  Eric.	  Science	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Computer	  Simulation.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2011.	  	   This	  is	  a	  concise	  and	  readable	  account	  of	  simulation,	  idealization	  and	  fiction	  in	  scientific	  representation.	  It	  raises	  many	  significant	  issues	  in	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the	  area	  and	  provides	  a	  roughly	  instrumentalist	  answer	  to	  several	  key	  questions	  concerning	  the	  use	  of	  idealizations	  and	  fictions	  in	  representation.	  	  	  	  	  ANTHOLOGIES	  AND	  EDITED	  COLLECTIONS	  	  As	  mentioned,	  representation	  is	  a	  growing	  and	  expanding	  field.	  The	  six	  volumes	  listed	  here	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  resulted	  from	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  events	  –	  conferences	  and	  workshops	  –	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  recent	  years,	  and	  display	  some	  of	  the	  intense	  levels	  of	  activity	  and	  excitement	  that	  nowadays	  surrounds	  this	  topic.	  Díez	  and	  Frigg	  2006	  is	  a	  pioneering	  collection	  edited	  by	  a	  team	  of	  two	  young	  European	  philosophers	  with	  credentials	  on	  structuralism	  and	  models.	  Gelfert	  2011	  contains	  essays	  devoted	  to	  a	  practical	  inquiry	  into	  representation.	  Humphreys	  and	  Imbert	  2012,	  and	  Vorms	  and	  Pincock	  2013,	  arise	  out	  of	  the	  series	  of	  conferences	  on	  Models	  and	  Simulations	  that	  have	  been	  taking	  place	  annually	  over	  the	  last	  6	  or	  so	  years.	  Lynch	  and	  Woolgar	  1990	  is	  a	  sociological	  approach	  to	  the	  topic.	  Morrison	  and	  Morgan	  1999	  is	  well-­‐known	  for	  launching	  the	  ‘mediating	  models’	  movement.	  	  	  Díez,	  José,	  and	  Roman	  Frigg,	  eds.	  “Scientific	  Representation.”	  Theoria	  (special	  issue),	  21:	  1	  (2006):	  5-­‐85.	  	   It	  includes	  papers	  by	  Andreas	  Bartels	  (defending	  homomorphism	  as	  an	  account	  of	  representation);	  Andoni	  Ibarra	  and	  Thomas	  Mormann	  (defending	  an	  ‘interventionist’	  approach	  to	  representation);	  Mauricio	  Suárez	  and	  Albert	  Solé	  (defending	  the	  plurality	  of	  deflationary	  approaches);	  Roman	  Frigg	  (criticizing	  the	  semantic	  conception);	  and	  Craig	  Callender	  and	  Jonathan	  Cohen	  (defending	  a	  Gricean	  account	  of	  representation	  as	  stipulation).	  	  	  Gelfert,	  Axel,	  ed.	  “Model-­‐Based	  Representation	  in	  Scientific	  Practice.”	  Studies	  in	  History	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  (special	  issue),	  42,	  2	  (2011):	  251-­‐398.	  	   It	  includes	  essays	  by	  Tarja	  Knuuttila	  (discussing	  an	  artefactual	  approach	  to	  model-­‐based	  representation);	  Axel	  Gelfert	  (on	  the	  inferential	  uses	  of	  mathematical	  representation),	  Marion	  Vorms	  (on	  the	  format	  of	  imaginary	  models	  in	  scientific	  practice),	  Demetris	  Portides	  (on	  phenomenological	  model-­‐building)	  and	  Margaret	  Morrison	  (on	  the	  underdetermination	  of	  models).	  	  	  Humphreys,	  Paul,	  and	  Ciryl	  Imbert.	  Models,	  Simulations,	  and	  Representations.	  London:	  Routledge,	  2012.	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   It	  contains	  a	  range	  of	  different	  essays	  by	  senior	  and	  younger	  scholars	  alike	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  relation	  between	  simulation	  and	  representation	  in	  general,	  and	  provides	  a	  good	  entry	  point	  into	  the	  subject.	  	  	   	  Lynch,	  Michael,	  and	  Steven	  Woolgar,	  eds.	  Representation	  in	  Scientific	  Practice.	  Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  MIT	  Press,	  1990.	  	   This	  is	  a	  well-­‐known	  collection	  in	  the	  sociology	  of	  science	  edited	  by	  two	  prominent	  scholars	  on	  techniques	  of	  representation	  across	  the	  sciences.	  It	  contains	  some	  fine	  sociological	  discussions	  of	  representational	  practices	  in	  diverse	  fields	  such	  as	  physics,	  the	  life	  sciences,	  socio-­‐biology,	  physiology	  and	  cognitive	  science.	  	  	  Morrison,	  Margaret,	  and	  Mary	  Morgan,	  eds.	  Models	  as	  Mediators:	  Perspectives	  on	  Natural	  and	  Social	  Science.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999.	  	   This	  volume	  collects	  essays	  resulting	  from	  a	  pioneering	  research	  project	  at	  the	  London	  School	  of	  Economics,	  Amsterdam’s	  Tinbergen	  Institute,	  and	  Berlin’s	  Wissenschaftkolleg	  in	  the	  mid	  1990s.	  The	  project,	  and	  ensuing	  volume	  established	  the	  so-­‐called	  “mediating	  models”	  movement,	  according	  to	  which	  models	  are	  autonomous	  and	  independent	  of	  both	  theory	  and	  data.	  	  	  	  Vorms,	  Marion,	  and	  Christopher	  Pincock,	  eds.	  “Models	  and	  Simulations	  4”.	  Synthese	  (special	  issue),	  2013.	  	   It	  contains	  essays	  engaged	  in	  a	  practical	  inquiry	  into	  representation	  and	  simulation.	  Three	  essays	  in	  particular	  explicitly	  address	  scientific	  representation,	  namely	  those	  by:	  Agnes	  Bolinska	  (a	  critique	  of	  the	  inferential	  conception),	  Gordon	  Purves	  (a	  critique	  of	  Winsberg’s	  account	  of	  fictional	  representation);	  and	  Peter	  Gildenhuys	  (on	  representational	  practices	  in	  classical	  population	  genetics).	  	  	  	  	  	  HISTORICAL	  BACKGROUND	  	  One	  of	  the	  main	  strands	  of	  philosophical	  work	  that	  feeds	  into	  contemporary	  discussions	  is	  the	  long	  modelling	  tradition	  in	  science	  –	  as	  well	  as	  philosophical	  commentary	  and	  reflection	  upon	  this	  tradition.	  Three	  key	  primary	  sources	  are	  Boltzmann	  1902,	  Maxwell,	  1990	  (1856),	  and	  Hertz	  1956	  (1894).	  They	  are	  followed	  by	  a	  selection	  of	  a	  few	  amongst	  many	  philosophical	  discussions	  and	  reactions	  that	  they	  have	  prompted.	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Primary	  Sources	  	  Ludwig	  Boltzmann,	  James	  Clerk	  Maxwell	  and	  Heinrich	  Hertz	  stand	  as	  some	  of	  the	  towering	  thinkers	  that	  started	  a	  tradition	  of	  philosophically	  minded	  physical	  science,	  where	  modelling	  and	  representation	  play	  a	  main	  role.	  More	  specifically	  Maxwell	  initiated	  a	  novel	  way	  to	  carry	  out	  modelling	  as	  analogical	  reasoning,	  Hertz	  gave	  a	  full	  development	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  representations	  characteristic	  of	  the	  neo-­‐Kantian	  German	  speaking	  modelling	  tradition,	  and	  Boltzmann	  attempted	  an	  imaginative	  rebranding	  of	  both	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  radical	  Viennese	  tradition.	  Together	  they	  helped	  put	  modelling	  centre	  stage.	  	  	  Boltzmann,	  Ludwig.	  “Models”.	  Encyclopedia	  Britannica	  10th	  Edition	  (1902):	  788	  –	  791.	  	   This	  is	  a	  classic	  text	  on	  models	  as	  representations	  by	  one	  of	  the	  most	  imaginative	  and	  reflective	  physicists	  of	  the	  late	  19th	  century.	  It	  discusses	  both	  the	  nature	  of	  models	  as	  images	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  the	  role	  that	  models	  play	  in	  the	  development	  of	  mathematical	  physics.	  	  	  Maxwell,	  James	  Clerk.	  “Analogies	  in	  Nature:	  Essay	  for	  the	  Apostles”.	  Reprinted	  in	  Harman,	  Peter,	  ed.	  The	  Scientific	  Letters	  and	  Papers	  of	  James	  Clerk	  Maxwell.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press	  (1990):	  376-­‐383.	  	   Maxwellian	  electrodynamics	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  methodological	  revolution	  in	  late	  19th	  century	  physics	  that	  brought	  about	  the	  new	  modelling	  tradition.	  This	  is	  Maxwell’s	  most	  philosophical	  essay	  where	  he	  discusses	  some	  debts	  and	  implications	  of	  his	  modelling	  attitude.	  Originally	  published	  in	  1856.	  	   	  	  Hertz,	  Hermann.	  The	  Principles	  of	  Mechanics	  Presented	  in	  a	  New	  Form.	  New	  York:	  Dover	  Publications,	  1956.	  	   This	  is	  the	  translation	  into	  English	  of	  what	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  important	  work	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  bildtheorie,	  or	  theory	  of	  representations	  –	  the	  view	  that	  came	  to	  dominate	  the	  philosophical	  language	  and	  landscape	  amongst	  German-­‐speaking	  scholars	  in	  the	  early	  20th	  century.	  Originally	  published	  in	  1894,	  it	  contains	  some	  perspicuous	  discussions	  of	  the	  role	  and	  nature	  of	  scientific	  representation,	  and	  remains	  unsurpassed	  in	  its	  clarity	  and	  depth.	  	  	  
Secondary	  Sources	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Bailer-­‐Jones	  2009	  reviews	  the	  history	  of	  philosophical	  reflection	  upon	  models;	  Hunt	  1991	  recounts	  the	  history	  of	  modelling	  in	  the	  19th	  century;	  De	  Regt	  2005	  links	  the	  19th	  century	  Bildtheorie	  to	  current	  concerns	  regarding	  explanation;	  and	  Nersessian	  2008	  is	  a	  study	  of	  the	  cognitive	  structures	  underlying	  Maxwell’s	  work.	  	  	  Bailer-­‐Jones,	  Daniela.	  Scientific	  Models	  in	  Philosophy	  of	  Science.	  Pittsburgh:	  University	  of	  Pittsburgh	  Press,	  2009.	  	  This	  book	  is	  a	  comprehensive	  historical	  account	  of	  philosophical	  interest	  on	  models	  and	  representation,	  and	  it	  will	  attract	  anyone	  with	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  It	  discusses	  19th	  century	  science	  views	  on	  analogy,	  Pierre	  Duhem’s	  disparaging	  reaction,	  the	  logical	  empiricist	  confinement	  of	  models	  to	  heuristics,	  and	  the	  1960’s	  British	  reaction	  in	  favour	  of	  models,	  as	  well	  as	  more	  recent	  debates.	  	  	  	  De	  Regt,	  Henk.	  “Ludwig	  Boltzmann’s	  ‘Bildtheorie’	  and	  Scientific	  Understanding”.	  Synthese,	  119	  (2005):	  113-­‐134.	  	   This	  paper	  brings	  Boltzmann’s	  version	  of	  the	  bildtheorie	  to	  bear	  on	  current	  debates	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  explanation	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  explanatory	  force	  of	  representation.	  Highly	  recommended	  for	  those	  looking	  for	  a	  historical	  introduction	  to	  the	  topic	  –	  and	  a	  good	  example	  of	  contemporary	  iH&PS	  (integrated	  History	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  Science)—style	  work	  at	  its	  best.	  	  	  Hunt,	  Bruce	  J.	  The	  Maxwellians.	  Ithaca	  and	  London:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1991.	  	   A	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  modelling	  attitude	  in	  Victorian	  19th	  century	  physics.	  It	  discusses	  the	  models	  and	  modelling	  techniques	  of	  Maxwell,	  Thomson,	  Lodge,	  Heaviside	  and	  Fitzgerald	  in	  detail,	  and	  provides	  invaluable	  historical	  background	  to	  the	  origin	  of	  philosophical	  reflection	  upon	  the	  techniques	  of	  representation	  that	  developed	  in	  the	  British	  Isles.	  	  	  Nersessian,	  Nancy.	  Creating	  Scientific	  Concepts.	  Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  MIT	  Press,	  2008.	  	   A	  study	  of	  the	  cognitive	  practices	  underlying	  James	  Clerk	  Maxwell’s	  development	  of	  his	  vortex	  models	  of	  the	  ether.	  It	  interprets	  Maxwell’s	  modelling	  methodology	  in	  terms	  of	  model-­‐based	  reasoning,	  and	  provides	  an	  elegant	  account	  of	  how	  representational	  practices	  may	  serve	  to	  generate	  new	  concepts.	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  THE	  SYNTATIC	  AND	  SEMANTIC	  VIEWS	  	  One	  of	  the	  main	  strands	  that	  feeds	  into	  contemporary	  debates	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  representation	  concerns	  the	  nature	  of	  scientific	  theory,	  and	  is	  a	  direct	  descendant	  of	  attempts	  –	  in	  the	  logical	  empiricist	  tradition	  of	  Hempel,	  Carnap	  and	  others	  –,	  to	  develop	  an	  account	  of	  the	  confirmation	  and	  explanatory	  power	  of	  scientific	  theories.	  Representation	  comes	  to	  the	  fore	  in	  the	  1980’s	  when	  a	  semantic	  conception	  of	  theories	  comes	  to	  replace	  the	  language-­‐based,	  or	  syntactic,	  conception	  of	  the	  logical	  empiricists.	  Suppe	  1977	  recounts	  the	  history	  of	  the	  received	  or	  syntactic	  view,	  and	  the	  reasons	  that	  led	  many	  to	  abandon	  it;	  Giere	  1988	  defends	  a	  model-­‐based	  version	  of	  the	  semantic	  conception;	  Suppes	  2002	  promotes	  a	  roughly	  structural	  version;	  and	  Van	  Fraasseen	  1980	  outlines	  a	  phase	  space	  version.	  	  	   	  Giere,	  Ronald	  N.	  Explaining	  Science.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1988.	  	   A	  classic	  text	  introducing	  a	  cognitive	  science-­‐based	  version	  of	  the	  semantic	  view.	  Chapter	  3	  in	  particular	  is	  the	  source	  of	  a	  widespread	  division,	  within	  the	  semantic	  conception,	  between	  a	  theoretical	  ‘definition’	  and	  a	  theoretical	  ‘hypothesis’.	  Note	  that	  Giere’s	  version	  of	  the	  semantic	  view	  does	  not	  require	  a	  structural	  or	  model-­‐theoretic	  understanding	  of	  models.	  	  	  	  Suppes,	  Patrick.	  Representation	  and	  Invariance	  of	  Scientific	  Structures.	  CSLI	  Publications.	  Leland	  Stanford	  Junior	  University,	  2002.	  	   A	  classic	  and	  very	  influential	  text	  by	  one	  of	  the	  major	  figures	  in	  analytical	  philosophy	  of	  science	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  The	  original	  text	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  early	  1970’s,	  and	  is	  reprinted	  here	  virtually	  unchanged.	  It	  provides	  a	  thorough	  defence	  of	  the	  applicability	  of	  mathematical	  methods	  to	  data	  and	  measurement	  structures,	  and	  advances	  the	  structural	  version	  of	  the	  semantic	  conception	  of	  theories.	  	  	  	  Suppe,	  Frederik.	  The	  Structure	  of	  Scientific	  Theories.	  Illinois	  and	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Illinois	  Press,	  1977.	  	   The	  is	  a	  celebrated	  collection	  containing	  several	  essays	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  theory,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘received’	  or	  syntactic	  view	  was	  opening	  the	  way	  to	  the	  new	  semantic	  view.	  Philosophers	  who,	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  logical	  empiricism,	  pursue	  questions	  regarding	  the	  nature	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of	  scientific	  theories	  are	  thus	  enabled	  to	  adopt	  representation	  as	  the	  key	  notion	  in	  the	  relation	  of	  theories	  to	  the	  world.	  	  	  Van	  Fraassen,	  Bas.	  The	  Scientific	  Image.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1980.	  	   Another	  classic	  text	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  science,	  defending	  both	  a	  semantic	  conception	  of	  theories	  –	  in	  Van	  Fraassen’s	  preferred	  phase	  space	  version	  –	  and	  a	  form	  of	  anti-­‐realism	  regarding	  the	  hypothetical	  unobservable	  entities	  postulated	  in	  such	  theories.	  	  	  	  	  MODELLING	  AND	  IDEALIZATION	  	  The	  other	  strand	  that	  feeds	  into	  contemporary	  debates	  on	  representation	  is	  the	  large	  and	  very	  intense	  philosophical	  literature	  of	  the	  last	  20	  or	  so	  years	  on	  modelling	  and	  idealization.	  The	  texts	  below	  constitute	  just	  a	  very	  small	  selection	  within	  that	  large	  body	  of	  literature	  dealing	  with	  scientific	  modelling.	  Cartwright	  1983	  and	  Galison	  1997	  are	  some	  key	  advanced	  research	  references.	  Hartmann	  and	  Frigg	  2006	  is	  an	  accessible	  introduction.	  Jones	  and	  Cartwright	  2005	  and	  Magnani	  et	  al.	  1999	  are	  collections	  of	  papers	  on	  idealization	  and	  representation	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  difficulty.	  Weisberg	  2007	  is	  an	  example	  of	  recent	  ground	  breaking	  research	  in	  the	  area.	  Woods	  2010	  is	  unusual	  in	  its	  focus	  on	  fiction	  within	  science	  and	  literature,	  and	  may	  provide	  a	  good	  point	  of	  entry	  for	  those	  in	  aesthetics,	  literary	  theory	  and	  criticism,	  and	  other	  areas	  of	  philosophy	  outside	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  	  	  	  Cartwright,	  Nancy.	  How	  the	  Laws	  of	  Physics	  Lie.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1983.	  	   Cartwright’s	  first	  book	  defends	  realism	  for	  phenomenological	  laws,	  and	  antirealism	  regarding	  explanatory	  theory.	  Its	  simulacrum	  account	  of	  explanation	  is	  particularly	  well	  known,	  as	  is	  the	  view	  that	  explanatory	  or	  covering	  law	  power	  is	  often	  inversely	  related	  to	  descriptive	  accuracy.	  	  	  	   	  Galison,	  Peter.	  Image	  and	  Logic.	  Chicago:	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  1997.	  	   It	  details	  the	  development	  of	  theoretical	  practices	  as	  major	  representational	  tools	  in	  20th	  century	  particle	  physics.	  Galison’s	  work	  was	  key	  in	  setting	  the	  view	  that	  theory	  involves	  its	  own	  practice	  –	  thus	  inviting	  the	  view	  that	  representation	  in	  general	  is	  also	  a	  practice.	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Hartmann,	  Stephan,	  and	  Roman	  Frigg.	  “Models	  in	  Science”.	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy,	  2006.	  	   A	  concise	  and	  clear	  introduction	  to	  the	  general	  topic	  of	  models	  and	  representation,	  separating	  the	  main	  issues	  in	  3	  distinct	  areas	  (semantics,	  ontology	  and	  epistemology),	  and	  reviewing	  some	  of	  the	  most	  general	  philosophical	  implications.	  	  	  	  Jones,	  Martin,	  and	  Nancy	  Cartwright,	  eds.	  Correcting	  the	  Model:	  Idealisation	  and	  Abstraction	  in	  the	  Sciences.	  Poznan	  Studies	  in	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Sciences	  and	  Humanities,	  68.	  New	  York:	  Rodopi,	  2005.	  	   This	  collection	  of	  essays	  chiefly	  deals	  with	  the	  distinction	  between	  abstraction	  and	  idealization,	  and	  other	  concomitant	  notions.	  The	  distinction	  is	  key	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  representation	  in	  science	  involves	  either	  fiction	  or	  misrepresentation	  of	  one	  or	  another	  sort.	  	  	   	  Magnani,	  Lorenzo,	  et	  al.	  (eds.),	  Model-­‐Based	  Reasoning	  in	  Scientific	  Discovery.	  Kluwer	  Academic	  Publishers,	  1999.	  	   This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  first	  volumes	  to	  have	  appeared	  in	  the	  series	  collecting	  the	  proceedings	  of	  the	  conferences	  that	  Lorenzo	  Magnani	  and	  collaborators	  have	  put	  together	  in	  Pavia,	  Italy,	  on	  topics	  closely	  related	  to	  scientific	  representation.	  The	  book	  contains	  some	  key	  papers	  by	  Giere,	  Hartmann,	  Bailer-­‐Jones,	  etc.,	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  models	  represent	  their	  intended	  targets.	  	  	  Weisberg,	  Michael.	  “Who	  is	  a	  Modeler?”.	  British	  Journal	  for	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  58:	  2	  (2007):	  207-­‐233.	  	   A	  defence	  of	  a	  model-­‐based	  strategy	  in	  science	  as	  a	  form	  of	  indirect	  representation	  of	  systems	  of	  interest,	  suitably	  emphasising	  both	  the	  provisional	  and	  idealized	  character	  of	  models,	  and	  their	  capacity	  to	  instruct	  and	  inform	  regarding	  observed	  phenomena.	  	  	  Wood,	  John,	  ed.	  Fictions	  and	  Models:	  New	  Essays.	  Munich:	  Philosophia	  Verlag,	  2010.	  	   A	  recent	  collection	  of	  essays	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  fictional	  representation	  in	  science	  and	  elsewhere,	  which	  includes	  interesting	  analogies	  between	  the	  modes	  of	  representation	  in	  science	  and	  those	  in	  mathematics,	  art	  and	  literature.	  	  The	  emphasis	  is	  on	  the	  fictional	  character	  of	  many	  scientific	  representations,	  and	  how	  this	  may	  or	  not	  be	  consistent	  with	  a	  realist	  attitude	  to	  representation	  in	  general.	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  ANALYTICAL	  INQUIRIES	  INTO	  SCIENTIFIC	  REPRESENTATION	  	  	  Inquiries	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  representation	  are	  not	  new,	  they	  have	  a	  long	  history	  that	  takes	  them	  back	  at	  least	  to	  the	  19th	  century.	  	  There	  is	  an	  analytical	  type	  of	  inquiry	  that	  asks	  questions	  regarding	  the	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  representation.	  In	  other	  words	  it	  aims	  to	  define	  the	  concept.	  Typically	  representation	  is	  here	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  relation	  between	  what	  we	  may	  call	  sources	  and	  targets	  –	  where	  the	  sources	  are	  the	  vehicles	  (i.e.	  models)	  and	  the	  targets	  are	  the	  intended	  objects	  of	  the	  representation.	  More	  complex	  analytical	  inquiries	  do	  not	  suppose	  the	  relations	  are	  necessarily	  dyadic,	  but	  they	  do	  assume	  representation	  can	  be	  defined	  analytically.	  Peirce	  1931	  contains	  some	  pioneering	  reflections	  on	  scientific	  representation,	  which	  opened	  up	  the	  field	  of	  semiotics.	  He	  founded	  both	  the	  analytical	  and	  the	  practical	  inquiry	  into	  representation.	  Bolinska	  2013	  and	  Rusanen	  and	  Lappi	  2012	  exemplify	  recent	  attempts	  to	  provide	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  on	  representation	  as	  the	  conveyor	  of	  information	  –	  they	  will	  appeal	  to	  anyone	  with	  an	  interest	  on	  the	  role	  of	  information.	  Frigg	  2010	  and	  Toon	  2012	  deal	  with	  fictional	  representation	  –	  and	  will	  interest	  those	  with	  literary	  and	  artistic	  backgrounds.	  Swoyer	  1991	  is	  a	  foundational	  text	  that	  should	  interest	  everyone,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  hardly	  introductory.	  	  	  Peirce,	  Charles	  Sanders.	  Collected	  Papers,	  Volume	  2:	  Elements	  of	  Logic.	  Edited	  by	  Charles	  Hartshorne	  and	  Paul	  Weiss.	  Cambridge,	  Mass:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1931.	  	   Peirce	  is	  the	  originator	  of	  the	  field	  of	  semiotics,	  or	  the	  science	  of	  signs.	  He	  distinguished	  three	  kinds	  of	  signs	  and	  developed	  a	  complex	  and	  influential	  view,	  according	  to	  which	  representation	  is	  not	  dyadic,	  but	  triadic;	  it	  involves	  not	  only	  a	  source	  and	  a	  target,	  but	  also	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  source	  that	  allows	  it	  to	  stand	  for	  the	  target.	  	  	  	  Bolinska,	  Agnes.	  “Epistemic	  Representation,	  Informativeness	  and	  the	  Aim	  of	  Faithful	  Representatioin”,	  Synthese	  190:	  2	  (2013):	  219-­‐234.	  	   This	  paper	  by	  a	  young	  and	  promising	  scholar	  addresses	  directly	  the	  notion	  of	  information	  that	  appears	  as	  part	  of	  the	  inferential	  conception	  of	  representation	  (see	  below:	  *Deflationary	  approaches*).	  It	  argues	  for	  a	  completion	  of	  the	  inferential	  conception	  in	  terms	  of	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  deriving	  from	  information.	  	  Rusanen,	  Anna-­‐Mari,	  and	  Otto	  Lappi.	  “An	  Information	  Semantic	  Account	  of	  Scientific	  Models”.	  In	  De	  Regt,	  Henk,	  Stephan	  Hartmann	  and	  Samir	  Okasha,	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eds.	  EPSA	  Philosophy	  of	  Science:	  Amsterdam	  2009.	  Dordrecht:	  Springer	  (2012):	  315-­‐327.	  	   It	  goes	  beyond	  extant	  accounts	  in	  providing	  a	  complementary	  information-­‐based	  view.	  Again,	  very	  much	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  analytic	  inquiry,	  searching	  for	  a	  complete	  set	  of	  conditions	  that	  define	  the	  abstract	  concept	  of	  representation,	  yet	  sensitive	  to	  issues	  of	  practical	  applications	  too.	  	  	  Frigg,	  Roman.	  “Models	  and	  Fiction”,	  Synthese,	  172,	  2	  (2010):	  251-­‐268.	  	   One	  of	  the	  earliest	  attempts	  to	  apply	  the	  full	  machinery	  of	  Walton’s	  pretence	  theory	  of	  fictions	  to	  scientific	  modelling.	  It	  proposes	  a	  two-­‐tiered	  account	  of	  representation	  by	  models.	  	  Toon,	  Adam.	  Models	  as	  Made-­‐Believe:	  Imagination,	  Fiction	  and	  Scientific	  Representation.	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2012.	  	   Another	  impressive	  attempt	  by	  a	  young	  scholar	  to	  apply	  Walton’s	  theory	  of	  fictions	  to	  scientific	  representation,	  thus	  providing	  a	  set	  of	  supposedly	  necessarily	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  on	  the	  representation	  of	  systems	  by	  model	  sources.	  	  	  Swoyer,	  Christopher.	  “Structural	  Representation	  and	  Surrogative	  Reasoning”.	  Synthese,	  87	  (1991):	  449	  –	  508.	  	   One	  of	  the	  first	  papers	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  essential	  role	  of	  representation	  in	  reasoning	  and	  inference	  in	  scientific	  contexts.	  The	  paper	  attempts	  to	  ground	  such	  activities	  upon	  a	  roughly	  structural	  account,	  although	  it	  presciently	  announces	  that	  no	  particular	  type	  of	  morphism,	  or	  structural	  mapping,	  will	  do	  for	  representation.	  	  	  	  	  	  PRACTICAL	  INQUIRIES	  INTO	  SCIENTIFIC	  REPRESENTATION	  	  A	  practical	  inquiry	  into	  representation	  will	  raise	  questions	  regarding	  the	  typical	  means	  that	  representations	  take	  in	  practice,	  without	  worrying	  too	  much	  as	  to	  whether	  these	  typical	  means	  may	  be	  part	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  concept.	  Thus	  philosophers,	  historians	  and	  sociologists	  of	  science	  who	  are	  involved	  in	  a	  practical	  inquiry	  will	  describe	  modelling	  practice	  and	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	  types	  of	  properties	  of	  representations	  that	  play	  an	  active	  role	  in	  the	  way	  that	  scientists	  use	  them.	  Practical	  and	  analytical	  inquiries	  are	  not	  always	  exclusive,	  but	  can	  be	  complimentary,	  and	  Peirce’s	  original	  theory	  of	  signs	  also	  has	  an	  origin	  in	  his	  practical	  work	  as	  a	  scientist	  in	  charge	  of	  geodetic	  surveys	  in	  the	  East	  coast	  during	  the	  1870s	  and	  1880s.	  Hughes	  2010	  is	  a	  book-­‐length	  treatment	  of	  modelling	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  practical	  inquiry.	  Suárez	  2009	  is	  a	  selection	  of	  papers	  on	  fictional	  representation	  –
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oriented	  towards	  a	  practical	  inquiry.	  Graham	  Kennedy	  2012,	  Knuuttila	  2009,	  Perini	  2010,	  and	  Peschard	  2011	  are	  all	  very	  good	  examples	  of	  recent	  practical	  inquiries	  –	  and,	  incidentally,	  all	  written	  by	  women.	  	  	  Graham	  Kennedy,	  Ashley.	  “A	  Non-­‐Representationalist	  View	  of	  Model	  Explanation”.	  Studies	  in	  History	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  43:	  2	  (2012):	  233-­‐240.	   	  	   It	  describes	  some	  modelling	  practices	  in	  astrophysics,	  and	  aims	  to	  establish	  on	  this	  ground	  that	  explanation	  does	  not	  require	  representation.	  However,	  it	  defines	  representation	  narrowly	  in	  a	  substantive	  sense,	  so	  a	  reinterpretation	  of	  the	  work	  is	  invited	  that	  furnishes	  a	  description	  of	  some	  representational	  means	  in	  practice.	  	  	  Hughes,	  RIG.	  The	  Theoretical	  Practices	  of	  Physics.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010.	  	   A	  very	  thorough	  and	  charismatic	  treatment	  of	  representational	  practices	  and	  means	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  historical	  episodes	  in	  theoretical	  physics,	  from	  Galileo	  to	  the	  Ising	  model.	  The	  textual	  analysis	  approach	  lends	  it	  a	  refreshingly	  novel	  outlook.	  Hughes	  was	  one	  of	  the	  key	  original	  thinkers	  on	  this	  topic,	  and	  this	  book	  summarizes	  his	  work	  in	  this	  area	  over	  the	  years.	  	  	  	   	  Knuuttila,	  Tarja.	  “Some	  Consequences	  of	  the	  Pragmatist	  Approach	  to	  Representation:	  Decoupling	  the	  Model-­‐Target	  Dyad	  and	  Indirect	  Reasoning.”	  In	  M.	  Suárez,	  M.	  Dorato	  and	  M.	  Rédei,	  eds.	  EPSA	  Epistemology	  and	  Methodology:	  Launch	  of	  the	  European	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  Association.	  Dordrecht:	  Springer,	  2009:	  139-­‐148.	  	   An	  analysis	  of	  both	  recent	  pragmatist	  approaches	  to	  representation	  and	  indirect	  reasoning	  accounts.	  It	  nicely	  signals	  a	  shift	  from	  the	  analytical	  to	  the	  practical	  inquiry	  into	  representation,	  and	  argues	  for	  it	  on	  philosophical	  as	  well	  as	  practical	  grounds.	  	  	  	  Perini,	  Laura.	  “Scientific	  Representation	  and	  the	  Semiotics	  of	  Pictures”.	  In	  Magnus,	  P.D.	  and	  Jacop	  Busch,	  eds.	  New	  Waves	  in	  Philosophy	  of	  Science.	  London:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan	  (2010):	  131-­‐154.	  	   This	  paper	  argues	  by	  means	  of	  a	  number	  of	  detailed	  case	  studies	  that	  some	  commonplace	  assumptions	  about	  visual	  representation	  in	  science	  are	  mistaken.	  In	  particular	  it	  shows	  that	  visual	  representations	  may	  convey	  truths;	  and	  that	  a	  visual	  representation	  need	  not	  hold	  any	  relevant	  similarity	  or	  resemblance	  to	  its	  target.	  Perini	  argues	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convincingly	  for	  a	  semiotic	  understanding	  of	  visual	  representations	  as	  complex	  signs	  in	  symbol	  systems	  á	  la	  Goodman.	  	  	  Peschard,	  Isabelle.	  “Making	  Sense	  of	  Modeling:	  Beyond	  Representation”.	  European	  Journal	  for	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  1:	  3	  (2011):	  335	  -­‐352.	  	   A	  research	  paper	  that,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  some	  interesting	  contemporary	  models	  in	  fluid	  dynamics,	  urges	  philosophers	  to	  overcome	  the	  notion	  of	  representation	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  focusing	  on	  representation	  as	  an	  activity	  and	  not	  as	  a	  relation	  (or	  at	  any	  rate	  not	  a	  relation	  between	  our	  concepts	  and	  the	  external	  world).	  	  	  	  Suárez,	  Mauricio,	  ed.	  Fictions	  in	  Science:	  Philosophical	  Essays	  on	  Modeling	  and	  Idealization.	  London:	  Routledge,	  2009.	  	   It	  contains	  nine	  papers	  on	  the	  practical	  ways	  in	  which	  scientists	  employ	  fictional	  and	  idealizing	  assumptions	  as	  part	  of	  their	  representations.	  Arthur	  Fine’s	  seminal	  article	  “Fictionalism”	  (1993)	  is	  reprinted,	  and	  appears	  alongside	  others	  that	  were	  first	  delivered	  at	  a	  conference	  in	  Madrid	  in	  February	  2006,	  and	  are	  now	  pioneering	  contributions	  to	  the	  growing	  literature	  on	  fictional	  representation	  in	  the	  sciences	  (see	  Frigg	  2010	  and	  Toon	  2012	  cited	  under	  *Analytical	  Inquiries	  into	  Representation*	  above).	  	  	  	  	  SUBSTANTIVE	  APPROACHES	  	  A	  substantive	  approach	  to	  representation	  will	  try	  to	  reduce	  it	  to	  some	  other	  notion,	  or	  to	  otherwise	  define	  it	  away	  in	  terms	  of	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions.	  Substantive	  accounts	  have	  tended	  to	  come	  in	  two	  varieties:	  structural	  isomorphism,	  or	  similarity.	  	  	  
Isomorphism	  	  Amongst	  the	  former:	  Bueno	  et	  al.	  2002	  and	  French	  2003	  defend	  partial	  isomorphism;	  Mundy	  1986	  and	  Suppes	  2002	  (cited	  under	  *The	  Syntatic	  and	  Semantic	  Views*)	  propose	  homomorphism;	  while	  Van	  	  Fraassen	  1987	  suggests	  embedding	  (i.e.	  isomorphism	  to	  a	  substructure).	  	  	  Bueno,	  Otavio,	  Steven	  French	  and	  James	  Ladyman.	  “On	  Representing	  the	  Relationship	  between	  the	  Mathematical	  and	  the	  Empirical”.	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  69:	  3	  (2002):	  452	  –	  473.	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It	  discusses	  some	  of	  the	  objections	  to	  the	  partial	  isomorphism	  approach	  to	  representation,	  and	  argues	  for	  an	  extension	  to	  what	  the	  authors	  refer	  to	  as	  “partial	  homomorphism”.	  	  	  	  French,	  Steven.	  “A	  Model-­‐Theoretic	  Account	  of	  Representation	  (or,	  I	  Don’t	  Know	  Much	  About	  Art	  …	  but	  I	  Know	  it	  Involves	  Isomorphism).”	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  70:	  5	  (2003):	  1472-­‐1483.	  	   It	  argues	  against	  Suárez	  2003	  (cited	  under	  *Critiques*)	  and	  Hughes	  1997	  (cited	  under	  *Denotation	  /	  Stipulation*)	  that	  isomorphism	  may	  be	  both	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  representation.	  It	  also	  argues	  that	  this	  may	  be	  the	  case	  throughout	  the	  board	  –	  i.e.	  both	  in	  science	  and	  in	  the	  arts.	  	  	  	  Mundy,	  Brent.	  “On	  the	  General	  Theory	  of	  Meaningful	  Representation”.	  Synthese,	  67	  (1986):	  391	  -­‐	  437.	  	   An	  early	  attempt	  to	  understand	  representation	  as	  isomorphism	  in	  the	  physical	  sciences,	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  spacetime	  theories.	  The	  claim	  is	  often	  made	  in	  this	  context	  that	  diffeomorphism	  invariance	  is	  akin	  to	  theoretical	  equivalence,	  which	  prima	  facie	  lends	  credence	  to	  the	  representation-­‐as-­‐isomorphism	  view.	  	  	  	  Van	  Fraassen,	  Bas.	  “The	  Semantic	  Approach	  to	  Scientific	  Theories.”	  In	  Nancy	  Nersessian,	  ed.	  The	  Process	  of	  Science.	  Dordrecht:	  Kluwer	  (1987):	  105-­‐124.	  	   Here	  Van	  Fraassen	  comes	  tantalizingly	  close	  to	  explicitly	  endorsing	  a	  structural	  conception	  of	  representation,	  roughly	  as	  follows:	  a	  theory	  represents	  a	  phenomenon	  if	  it	  contains	  structures	  with	  substructures	  isomorphic	  to	  the	  phenomena.	  Van	  Fraassen	  has	  refined	  his	  views	  in	  later	  works,	  explicitly	  embracing	  a	  deflationary	  notion	  instead.	  	  	  
Similarity	  	  Amongst	  defenders	  of	  similarity,	  Aronson	  et	  al.	  1995,	  and	  Giere	  2004,	  are	  early	  proponents;	  Godfrey-­‐Smith	  2006,	  and	  Weisberg	  2012	  are	  more	  sophisticated	  developments.	  	  	  	  Aronson,	  Jerry,	  Eileen	  Way,	  and	  Rom	  Harré.	  Realism	  Rescued.	  London:	  Duckworth,	  1995.	  	   Rom	  Harré	  is	  one	  of	  the	  pioneers	  of	  philosophical	  interest	  on	  modelling,	  as	  a	  member	  of	  a	  prominent	  group	  of	  mainly	  British	  philosophers	  working	  in	  the	  late	  1960’s	  and	  early	  1970s	  on	  the	  topic,	  which	  included	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also	  Richard	  Braithwaite,	  Max	  Black,	  and	  Mary	  Hesse.	  The	  book	  advances	  the	  view	  that	  targets	  and	  sources	  of	  representations	  are	  similar,	  and	  builds	  an	  ontological	  hierarchy	  on	  these	  grounds.	  	  	  Giere,	  Ronald.	  “How	  Models	  are	  Used	  to	  Represent	  Reality”,	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  71:	  5	  (2004):	  742-­‐752.	  	   Ron	  Giere	  has	  long	  been	  a	  champion	  of	  similarity,	  and	  in	  this	  paper	  he	  expands	  on	  his	  early	  views	  by	  turning	  representation	  into	  a	  4-­‐place	  relation,	  with	  perceived	  similarity	  playing	  a	  key	  role.	  He	  then	  explores	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  representation	  is	  an	  effective	  modelling	  strategy.	  	  	  	  Godfrey-­‐Smith,	  Peter.	  “The	  Strategy	  of	  Model-­‐Based	  Science.”	  Biology	  and	  Philosophy,	  21	  (2006):	  725-­‐740.	  	   It	  brings	  together	  a	  number	  of	  relevant	  issues,	  such	  as	  fictions	  and	  representation,	  and	  shows	  how	  they	  play	  a	  role	  in	  model-­‐based	  science.	  It	  also	  offers	  a	  brief	  but	  clear	  defence	  of	  the	  role	  of	  similarity	  in	  scientific	  representation,	  which	  takes	  from	  Giere’s	  earlier	  work	  and	  leads	  to	  some	  subsequent	  work	  by	  some	  of	  Godfrey-­‐Smith’s	  students.	  	  	  Weisberg,	  Michael.	  Getting	  Serious	  about	  Similarity.	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  79:	  5	  (2012):	  785-­‐794.	  	   The	  basic	  problem	  with	  similarity	  as	  an	  account	  of	  representation	  is	  that	  it	  just	  seems	  to	  have	  the	  wrong	  logical	  properties	  to	  analyse	  representation.	  Similarity	  appears	  prima	  facie	  to	  be	  a	  symmetrical	  and	  reflexive	  relation,	  while	  representation	  patently	  is	  neither.	  In	  this	  paper	  Weisberg	  shows	  how	  to	  apply	  the	  insights	  into	  similarity	  judgements	  developed	  by	  empirical	  psychologists.	  	  	  	  
Critiques	  	  Defenders	  of	  similarity	  and	  isomorphism	  tend	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  universality	  and	  necessity	  of	  either	  for	  representation.	  Critics	  (Frigg	  2006;	  Suárez,	  2003)	  point	  out	  that	  the	  putatively	  reducing	  notions	  lack	  some	  fundamental	  logical	  properties	  of	  representation,	  so	  they	  can	  hardly	  constitute	  the	  reductive	  basis.	  Others	  (Downes	  1992;	  Toon	  2012)	  point	  to	  the	  manifest	  diversity	  of	  representational	  means.	  Van	  Fraassen	  is	  a	  remarkable	  critique	  of	  isomorphism	  as	  substantive	  account	  of	  representation	  on	  epistemic	  grounds.	  	  	  Downes,	  Steven.	  “The	  Importance	  of	  Models	  in	  Scientific	  Theorizing:	  A	  Deflationary	  Semantic	  Approach.”	  In	  D.	  Hull,	  M.	  Forbes	  and	  K.	  Okruhlik,	  eds.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  Association,	  1	  (1992):	  142-­‐153.	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   This	  is	  an	  early	  and	  pioneering	  defence	  of	  deflationism.	  Although	  it	  frames	  the	  issue	  within	  the	  semantic	  conception,	  it	  presciently	  anticipates	  some	  of	  the	  subsequent	  moves	  against	  substantive	  accounts	  of	  representation.	  	  	  Frigg,	  Roman.	  “Scientific	  Representation	  and	  the	  Semantic	  View	  of	  Theories.”	  Theoria,	  55	  (2006):	  49-­‐65.	  	   Not	  all	  defenders	  of	  the	  semantic	  conception	  have	  considered	  the	  issue	  of	  application,	  and	  not	  all	  have,	  in	  so	  doing,	  defended	  a	  structural	  version	  of	  the	  view.	  However,	  this	  paper	  argues	  convincingly	  that	  the	  semantic	  conception	  of	  the	  application	  of	  theories	  lends	  itself	  naturally	  to	  a	  structural	  conception	  of	  representation	  as	  isomorphism	  –	  and	  proceeds	  to	  criticize	  it	  for	  doing	  so.	  	  	  Suárez,	  Mauricio.	  “Scientific	  Representation:	  Against	  Similarity	  and	  Isomorphism.”	  International	  Studies	  in	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  17:	  3	  (2003):	  225-­‐244.	  	   It	  proposes	  five	  different	  arguments	  against	  similarity	  and	  isomorphism,	  and	  concludes	  that	  representation	  cannot	  be	  naturalised	  by	  reducing	  it	  to	  any	  relational	  dyadic	  version	  of	  either.	  It	  ends	  by	  suggesting	  non-­‐relational	  versions	  of	  these	  views,	  and	  indeed	  several	  philosophers	  reacted	  by	  developing	  more	  sophisticated	  accounts	  of	  their	  views	  in	  response.	  	  	  Toon,	  Adam.	  “Similarity	  and	  Scientific	  Representation”.	  International	  Studies	  in	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  26	  (2012):	  241-­‐257.	  	   This	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  recent	  paper	  in	  the	  contemporary	  critical	  trend	  against	  substantive	  theories.	  It	  takes	  extant	  criticisms	  of	  similarity	  further,	  by	  arguing	  against	  some	  sophisticated	  developments	  of	  the	  similarity	  view,	  such	  as	  Giere’s	  (2004).	  	  	  Van	  Fraassen,	  Bas.	  “Representation:	  The	  Problem	  for	  Structuralism.”	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  73	  (2006):	  536	  -­‐547.	  	   This	  is	  a	  curious	  paper	  in	  that	  it	  raises	  arguments	  against	  what	  appear	  to	  many	  to	  be	  Van	  Fraassen’s	  earlier	  views	  –	  i.e.	  against	  a	  purely	  structural	  conception	  of	  representation.	  The	  paper	  culminated	  with	  the	  very	  explicit	  endorsement	  of	  an	  intentional	  and	  pragmatist	  conception	  in	  Van	  Fraassen	  2008	  (*General	  Overviews*).	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  DEFLATIONARY	  APPROACHES	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  substantive	  approaches,	  deflationary	  views	  typically	  assume	  that	  representation	  lacks	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions.	  Deflationists	  typically	  will	  defend	  that	  representation	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  any	  property,	  relation,	  or	  set	  of	  properties	  or	  relations,	  of	  the	  objects	  that	  play	  the	  role	  of	  representational	  source	  and	  target.	  They	  propose	  instead	  to	  focus	  philosophical	  attention	  upon	  the	  features	  of	  the	  use	  of	  representations	  by	  agents	  in	  their	  particular	  contexts,	  attempting	  to	  generalize	  such	  uses	  whenever	  possible.	  In	  the	  recent	  literature	  there	  have	  been	  roughly	  two	  types	  of	  deflationary	  approaches.	  	  	  	  
Denotation	  /	  Stipulation	  	  One	  set	  of	  views	  links	  representation	  to	  acts	  of	  stipulation	  by	  agents	  that	  fix	  the	  denotation	  of	  the	  signs	  employed.	  Callender	  and	  Cohen	  (2006)	  emphasise	  the	  role	  of	  the	  act	  of	  stipulation	  itself;	  while	  Goodman	  1968,	  Hughes	  1997,	  and	  Elgin	  2009	  chose	  to	  emphasise	  the	  denotation	  relation	  –	  and	  the	  target	  of	  the	  referential	  relation	  thus	  established.	  On	  chronological	  grounds	  Goodman	  1968	  is	  the	  obvious	  entry	  point,	  but	  nothing	  beats	  Hughes	  1997	  for	  clarity	  and	  concision.	  	  	  	  Callender,	  Craig,	  and	  Jonathan	  Cohen.	  “There	  is	  no	  Special	  Problem	  About	  Scientific	  Representation”,	  Theoria,	  21:	  55	  (2006):	  67-­‐85.	  	   Callender	  and	  Cohen	  argue	  that	  scientific	  representation	  is	  merely	  another	  instance	  of	  (non-­‐natural,	  i.e.	  conventional)	  representation	  in	  general,	  so	  there	  is	  no	  special	  problem	  concerning	  specifically	  scientific	  representation.	  They	  show	  that	  a	  Gricean	  conception	  sheds	  light	  on	  a	  number	  of	  conundrums	  raised	  by	  scientific	  representation.	  	  	  	  Elgin,	  Catherine.	  “Exemplification,	  Idealization,	  and	  Understanding.”	  In	  M.	  Suárez,	  ed.	  Fictions	  in	  Science:	  Essays	  on	  Modelling	  and	  Idealization,	  London:	  Routledge	  (2009):	  77-­‐90.	  	   This	  paper	  provides	  an	  extension	  of	  Nelson	  Goodman’s	  account	  in	  terms	  of	  denotative	  function.	  It	  confronts	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  representation	  of	  fictive	  or	  non-­‐existent	  entities,	  such	  as	  unicorns.	  It	  argues	  that	  denotative	  function	  is	  not	  a	  success	  term	  so	  a	  sign	  or	  source	  with	  denotative	  function	  (a	  painting	  of	  a	  unicorn)	  need	  not	  denote	  anything	  in	  the	  actual	  world.	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Goodman,	  Nelson.	  Languages	  of	  Art:	  An	  Approach	  to	  a	  Theory	  of	  Symbols.	  Indianapolis:	  The	  Bobbs-­‐Merrill	  Company,	  1968.	  	   This	  is	  the	  classic	  statement	  of	  the	  denotation	  theory.	  It	  first	  raises	  some	  criticisms	  against	  resemblance	  or	  similarity	  theories,	  and	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  articulate	  the	  view	  that	  representation	  is	  essentially	  the	  denotation	  of	  an	  object	  by	  a	  symbol	  in	  a	  complex	  sign	  system.	  	  	  Hughes,	  RIG.	  “Models	  and	  Representation.”	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  64	  (1997):	  325-­‐36.	  	   This	  paper	  has	  already	  been	  mentioned	  as	  a	  classic	  in	  this	  area.	  It	  merits	  another	  mention	  specifically	  as	  a	  defence	  of	  a	  sophisticated	  version	  of	  Goodman’s	  theory.	  More	  particularly,	  Hughes	  develops	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  Denotation-­‐Demonstration-­‐Interpretation	  (DDI)	  account	  on	  which	  representation	  is	  typically	  (although	  not	  necessarily)	  characterised	  by	  these	  three	  separate	  components	  in	  a	  model.	  	   	   	  	  
Inference	  	  The	  other	  set	  of	  deflationary	  views	  focus	  on	  the	  inferential	  uses	  of	  representations.	  Suárez	  2004	  is	  an	  early	  statement	  of	  the	  inferential	  conception,	  which	  led	  Contessa	  2007	  to	  develop	  his	  own	  ‘interpretational’	  variant.	  Bueno	  and	  Colyvan	  2011	  and	  Newman	  2012	  are	  recent	  attempts	  to	  further	  apply	  the	  inferential	  conception	  to	  specifically	  mathematical	  representation	  and	  explanation,	  respectively.	  Zamora	  and	  De	  Donato	  2012	  attempt	  to	  provide	  the	  inferential	  conception	  with	  foundations	  in	  Robert	  Brandom’s	  philosophy	  of	  language.	  	  	  Bueno,	  Otavio,	  and	  Mark	  Colyvan.	  “An	  Inferential	  Conception	  of	  the	  Application	  of	  Mathematics.”	  Nous,	  45:	  2	  (2011):	  345-­‐374.	  	   The	  authors	  claim	  to	  be	  developing	  an	  inferential	  account	  of	  the	  sorts	  of	  scientific	  representations	  afforded	  by	  mathematical	  structures.	  Although	  they	  explicitly	  oppose	  a	  substantive	  conception	  of	  representation	  –	  a	  view	  they	  refer	  to	  as	  “the	  matching	  account”	  –,	  they	  also	  attempt	  to	  show	  that	  the	  inferential	  capacities	  of	  models	  ride	  upon	  structural	  relations.	  	  	  	  Contessa,	  Gabriele.	  “Scientific	  Representation.	  Interpretation	  and	  Surrogative	  Reasoning.”	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  74	  (2007):	  48-­‐68.	  	   The	  explicit	  aim	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  to	  further	  develop	  extant	  ‘distinctions	  between	  denotation,	  epistemic	  representation	  and	  faithful	  epistemic	  representation’.	  Using	  the	  inferential	  conception	  as	  foil,	  it	  develops	  out	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of	  it	  a	  substantive	  account	  of	  representation	  as	  interpreted	  surrogative	  reasoning.	  	  	  	  Newman,	  Mark.	  “An	  Inferential	  Model	  of	  Scientific	  Understanding.”	  International	  Studies	  in	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  26:	  1	  (2012):	  1-­‐26.	  	   Another	  exponent	  of	  what	  we	  may	  call	  the	  San	  Diego	  representation	  school	  (together	  with	  Callender	  and	  Cohen	  2006,	  cited	  under	  *Denotation	  /	  Stipulation*),	  this	  paper	  further	  applies	  insights	  from	  an	  inferential	  view	  on	  representation	  –	  and	  convincingly	  argues	  for	  a	  distinction	  between	  understanding	  and	  explanation	  on	  these	  inferential	  grounds.	  	  	  Suárez,	  Mauricio.	  “An	  Inferential	  Conception	  of	  Scientific	  Representation.”	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  71:5	  (2004):	  767-­‐779.	  	   It	  provides	  a	  first	  outline	  of	  an	  inferential	  conception	  of	  representation	  and	  it	  introduces	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  force	  and	  the	  inferential	  capacity	  of	  a	  representation,	  which,	  it	  argues,	  drives	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  model	  building.	  Its	  main	  virtue,	  however,	  may	  have	  been	  to	  provide	  critical	  foil	  for	  the	  development	  of	  other	  inferential	  views	  and	  approaches,	  including	  those	  listed	  in	  this	  section.	  	  	  Zamora-­‐Bonilla,	  Jesús,	  and	  Xavier	  De	  Donato.	  “Explanation	  and	  Modelization	  in	  a	  Comprehensive	  Inferential	  Account.”	  In	  De	  Regt,	  Henk,	  Stephan	  Hartmann,	  and	  Samir	  Okasha,	  eds.	  EPSA	  Philosophy	  of	  Science:	  Amsterdam	  2009.	  Dordrecht:	  Springer	  (2012):	  33-­‐42.	  	   The	  paper	  claims	  that	  the	  inferential	  character	  of	  scientific	  representations	  (models)	  may	  be	  captured	  in	  terms	  of	  Robert	  Brandom’s	  semantic	  inferentialism.	  It	  then	  attempts	  to	  display	  the	  analogues	  of	  Brandom’s	  entitlements	  and	  commitments	  at	  work	  in	  the	  development	  of	  scientific	  models.	  	  	  	  	  	  MENTAL	  REPRESENTATION	  AND	  COGNITIVE	  SCIENCE	  	  There	  is	  a	  large	  and	  thriving	  literature	  on	  representation	  within	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mind	  and	  cognitive	  science.	  Philosophers	  of	  science	  often	  approach	  these	  views	  in	  order	  to	  find	  inspiration	  and	  help,	  even	  though	  the	  commitment	  to	  representation	  as	  a	  mental	  state	  that	  is	  typical	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mind	  has,	  on	  the	  whole,	  being	  eschewed.	  Yet,	  some	  of	  the	  debates	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  replicate	  old	  debates	  in	  these	  areas.	  For	  instance,	  Cummings	  1997	  develops	  the	  analogue	  for	  mental	  representation	  of	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the	  substantive	  view	  of	  scientific	  representation	  as	  isomorphism.	  He	  essentially	  claims	  that	  mental	  representation	  is	  structural.	  His	  views	  have	  been	  criticised	  on	  grounds	  similar	  to	  those	  employed	  by	  critics	  of	  the	  isomorphism	  view	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  In	  particular,	  Millikan	  2000	  develops	  a	  rather	  convincing	  response.	  A	  recent	  account	  that	  takes	  inspiration	  from	  the	  structural	  isomorphism	  view,	  but	  stops	  short	  of	  attempting	  a	  reduction	  is	  Shagrir	  2012.	  Within	  philosophy	  of	  science	  proper,	  Ronald	  Giere	  has	  long	  defended	  the	  application	  of	  cognitive	  science	  to	  scientific	  representation:	  Chapter	  5	  in	  Giere	  2006	  is	  an	  accessible	  and	  up	  to	  date	  introduction.	  	  	  	  Cummings,	  Robert.	  Representations,	  Targets,	  and	  Attitudes.	  Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  MIT	  Press,	  1997.	  	   The	  usual	  reference	  for	  structural	  conceptions	  of	  mental	  representation,	  this	  is	  an	  advanced	  book	  in	  philosophy	  of	  mind	  by	  a	  technically	  gifted	  and	  proficient	  scholar.	  	  	  	  Millikan,	  Ruth.	  “Review	  of	  Cummings’	  “Representations,	  Targets	  and	  Attitudes.”	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research,	  60	  (2000):	  103-­‐113.	  	   This	  essay	  review	  raises	  a	  number	  of	  objections	  to	  the	  structural	  conception	  of	  mental	  representation	  defended	  by	  Cummings.	  Although	  it	  provides	  an	  elegant	  summary	  of	  the	  object	  of	  its	  critique,	  and	  constitutes	  a	  good	  entry	  point	  for	  the	  uninitiated,	  the	  interested	  reader	  is	  advised	  to	  consult	  some	  of	  the	  larger	  and	  more	  complete	  works	  on	  the	  topic,	  including	  the	  original	  source	  of	  the	  critique	  mentioned	  above.	  	  	  Giere,	  Ronald.	  Scientific	  Perspectivism.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2006.	  	   This	  is	  the	  last	  published	  book	  by	  a	  very	  prominent	  philosopher	  of	  science,	  which	  continues	  his	  defence	  of	  cognitive	  science	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  understanding	  scientific	  modelling	  in	  general.	  Chapter	  5,	  in	  particular,	  develops	  a	  distributed	  cognition	  approach	  to	  modelling.	  	  	  	  Shagrir,	  Oron.	  “Structural	  Representations	  and	  the	  Brain”.	  British	  Journal	  for	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science.	  63:	  3	  (2012):	  519-­‐545.	  	   An	  example	  of	  how	  the	  cognitive	  science	  literature	  is	  nowadays	  leaning	  towards	  a	  consideration	  of	  neurobiology	  and	  neurology	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  better	  understand	  mental	  representation.	  It	  sensibly	  falls	  short	  of	  reducing	  mental	  representation	  to	  any	  structural	  mappings.	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  REPRESENTATION	  IN	  ART	  AND	  SCIENCE	  	  Philosophers	  of	  science	  have	  been	  learning	  a	  fair	  amount	  from	  their	  colleagues	  over	  in	  aesthetics	  and	  the	  philosophy	  of	  art	  in	  recent	  years.	  Indeed	  the	  analogies	  between	  scientific	  and	  artistic	  modes	  of	  representation	  have	  regularly	  turned	  into	  fertile	  ground	  for	  understanding	  scientific	  modelling	  better.	  	  	  	  
Representation	  in	  Aesthetics	  	   	  One	  of	  the	  classic	  texts	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  art	  has	  already	  been	  mentioned	  (Nelson	  Goodman’s	  1968,	  cited	  under	  *Denotation	  /	  Stipulation*),	  and	  it	  has	  been	  made	  clear	  that	  its	  defence	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  representation	  as	  denotation	  has	  had	  a	  considerable	  impact	  upon	  present	  day	  discussions	  on	  scientific	  representation.	  There	  are	  other	  texts	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  art	  that	  have	  exerted	  influence,	  and	  several	  have	  become	  current	  objects	  of	  discussion	  amongst	  philosophers	  of	  science	  concerned	  with	  representation.	  A	  brief	  selection	  is	  listed	  in	  the	  first	  section	  including:	  Gombrich	  1960,	  which	  first	  proposes	  the	  substitution	  account	  and	  pretty	  much	  sets	  the	  field;	  Kulvicki	  2006	  which	  interestingly	  further	  develops	  the	  Goodman	  approach;	  Lopes	  1996	  which	  contains	  all	  the	  Goodman-­‐inspired	  criticisms	  of	  resemblance	  theories;	  and	  Wollheim	  1987	  which	  is	  the	  most	  ambitious	  philosophical	  attempt	  to	  date	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  representation	  in	  the	  arts.	  	  	  Gombrich,	  Ernst.	  Art	  and	  Illusion.	  London:	  Phaidon	  Press	  Limited,	  1960.	  	   Enormously	  influential,	  it	  defends	  a	  ‘substitution’	  account	  of	  representation,	  best	  exemplified	  in	  the	  often	  cited	  and	  much	  discussed	  example	  of	  a	  hobbyhorse.	  The	  substitution	  view	  fits	  in	  well	  with	  current	  emphasis	  amongst	  philosophers	  of	  science	  on	  the	  autonomous	  nature	  of	  models.	  	  	  Kulvicki,	  John.	  “Pictorial	  Representation”,	  Philosophy	  Compass	  1:	  6	  (2006):	  535-­‐546.	  Blackwell	  Publishing.	  	   A	  state	  of	  the	  art	  paper	  that	  moreover	  argues	  originally	  for	  a	  version	  of	  Goodman’s	  symbolic	  system	  view	  of	  representation	  as	  denotation	  by	  a	  complex	  sign.	  It	  offers	  a	  balanced	  review,	  providing	  an	  excellent	  entry	  point	  into	  the	  field.	  	  	   	   	  Lopes,	  Dominic.	  Understanding	  Pictures.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996.	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An	  elegant	  and	  comprehensive	  review	  of	  the	  main	  positions	  regarding	  representation	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  art.	  It	  develops	  a	  sustained	  criticism	  of	  resemblance	  theories	  of	  artistic	  representation,	  which	  philosophers	  of	  science	  have	  gone	  on	  to	  apply	  to	  scientific	  representation.	  It	  provides	  an	  excellent	  follow	  up	  to	  Kulvicki	  2006	  as	  a	  thorough	  and	  complete	  introduction.	  	  	  	  Wollheim,	  Richard.	  Painting	  as	  an	  Art.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1987.	  	   The	  book	  is	  a	  classic	  in	  the	  field,	  by	  one	  of	  its	  most	  eminent	  and	  distinguished	  scholars.	  Wolheim	  criticises	  extant	  views	  with	  delicate	  touch,	  and	  goes	  on	  to	  propose	  a	  notion	  of	  his	  own,	  namely	  “seeing-­‐in”,	  which	  appeals	  to	  some	  fundamental	  and	  primitive	  psychological	  dispositions.	  A	  challenging	  but	  enormously	  rewarding	  book.	  	  	   	  
Scientific	  and	  Artistic	  Representation	  	   	  The	  last	  section	  lists	  some	  key	  works	  explicitly	  dealing	  with	  the	  analogy	  between	  scientific	  and	  artistic	  representation:	  Suárez	  1999	  puts	  Wollheim’s	  insights	  to	  work	  in	  an	  study	  of	  the	  analogy	  between	  artistic	  and	  scientific	  representation;	  Downes	  2009	  applies	  critical	  lessons	  from	  Lopes	  against	  isomorphism	  views;	  Debs	  and	  Redhead	  2007	  develop	  a	  conventionalist	  account;	  Frigg	  and	  Hunter	  2010	  is	  a	  collection	  of	  essays	  that	  displays	  well	  the	  considerable	  recent	  interest	  on	  the	  art	  –	  science	  analogy.	  	  	  Debs,	  Talal	  A.,	  and	  Michael	  Redhead.	  Objectivity,	  Invariance	  and	  Convention:	  Symmetry	  in	  Physical	  Science.	  Chapter	  1.	  Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2007.	  	   	  Debs	  and	  Redhead	  develop	  a	  conventionalist	  account	  of	  representation	  in	  science,	  and	  distinguish	  objectivity	  from	  structural	  invariance,	  or	  symmetry,	  to	  which	  it	  often	  is	  linked.	  They	  instead	  emphasise	  the	  need	  to	  select	  conventional	  features	  for	  any	  representation,	  which	  they	  very	  originally	  illustrate	  by	  means	  of	  examples	  from	  the	  performance	  arts.	  	  	  	  Downes,	  Steven.	  “Models,	  Pictures,	  and	  Unified	  Accounts	  of	  Representation:	  Lessons	  from	  Aesthetics	  for	  Philosophy	  of	  Science.”	  Perspectives	  on	  Science,	  17,	  4	  (2009):	  417-­‐428.	  	   Downes	  applies	  the	  lessons	  from	  aesthetics	  to	  scientific	  representation	  in	  a	  straightforward	  and	  convincing	  manner.	  He	  shows	  that	  analogues	  of	  Goodman’s	  and	  Lopes’	  arguments	  against	  resemblance	  have	  bite	  against	  substantive	  conceptions	  of	  representation	  too.	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  Frigg,	  Roman,	  and	  Matthew	  Hunter,	  eds.	  Beyond	  Mimesis	  and	  Convention:	  Representation	  in	  Art	  and	  Science.	  Dordrecht:	  Springer,	  2010.	  	   This	  book	  collects	  some	  of	  the	  papers	  arising	  out	  of	  a	  conference	  on	  representation	  in	  art	  and	  science	  that	  took	  place	  in	  London	  in	  2006.	  It	  contains	  some	  papers	  on	  fictional	  representation,	  models	  and	  parables,	  illocutionary	  representational	  speech	  acts,	  functional	  versus	  informative	  conceptions	  of	  representation,	  and	  other	  relevant	  topics	  at	  the	  interface	  of	  the	  philosophies	  of	  science	  and	  art.	  	  	  Suárez,	  Mauricio.	  “Theories,	  Models,	  and	  Representations.”	  In	  Magnani,	  Lorenzo,	  et	  al.,	  eds.	  Model-­‐Based	  Reasoning	  in	  Scientific	  Discovery.	  Kluwer	  Academic	  Publishers	  (1999):	  75-­‐84.	  	   An	  early	  attempt	  to	  suggest	  a	  fruitful	  analogy	  between	  scientific	  and	  artistic	  representation.	  It	  introduces	  a	  distinction	  between	  representational	  and	  non-­‐representational	  uses	  of	  theories,	  and	  illustrates	  it	  by	  means	  of	  three	  paintings	  (by	  Velázquez,	  Picasso	  and	  Mondrian)	  that	  have	  thereafter	  often	  been	  discussed	  in	  relation	  with	  this	  analogy.	  	  
